Co-Design of Complex Systems: From Autonomy to Future Mobility Systems

Rethinking AV Development with Foundation Models Society-Critical Systems Co-Design

Postdoctoral Scholar Department of Aeronautics & Astronautics Stanford University

> Stanford University

... or ...

- MIT Mobility Forum
 - March 29, 2024 **Gioele Zardini**

PI, Incoming Assistant Professor LIDS, IDSS, CEE Massachusetts Institute of Technology




gzardini@mit.edu - https://gioele.science

Designing today's engineering systems could have positive societal impact, but is complex


• Autonomous systems as a proxy for complex systems, which might have positive societal impact



Autonomy for safer and efficient mobility (Motional)



Roboflies to monitor environments (Fuller et al.)



Autonomous robots for space exploration (Pavone et al.)



UAVs for search and rescue tasks (Scaramuzza et al.)





Need new tools to model and solve complex systems design optimization problems

Societal impact of new technologies depends on their **joint design** with **existing systems**



Intermodal mobility networks (NASA UAM)

30% of the cars would be enough

First- and *last-mile* mobility could make **public transit** more **convenient** and **attractive**

More affordable, sustainable



Single components are slowly well understood, but we still lack a (*formal* and *practical*) theory for the **task-driven co-design** of **complex systems**



Networks of tankers (Signal Ocean)

Example - Autonomy: Heaven or hell?







Agenda

Motivation

- New challenges of engineering design
- Motivation from autonomy and mobility
- Desiderata for co-design

Monotone Co-Design

- Modeling design problems
- Examples across domains
- Design queries and optimization
- From autonomy to mobility systems


Strategic interactions

- Game theory to deal with strategic interactions
- Partial order games

Outlook on future research

Website containing all papers and more pointers: <u>https://gioele.science</u>

Driven by societal challenges, I develop efficient computational tools to automate the formulation and solution of large, complex system design problems






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
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The vision of automated system co-design


task

Autonomy co-design






Mobility co-design











Autonomy as the frontier of complexity for the co-design of complex systems

A fleet of autonomous vehicles



har actuation sens

computation


energetics

OMG!

So many **components** (hardware, software, ...), and **choices** to make!

Nobody understands the **whole** thing!

anthropomorphization of 21st century engineering malaise



| . 1 | software | behavior | COO 1 | coordination | |
|-------|-------------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|--|
| rdwar | e localization | plan | ning in | vasivity | |
| nsing | control | interaction | learning | liability | |
| ו | perception | mapping | regula | egulations | |
| CS | communication | | infrastructure | | |

We forget why we made **choices**, and we are afraid to make **changes** (high failure cost). We need **faster** design cycles, **nimbler** execution.



Your system is just a component in another person's system


Infrastructure level

Service level

Platform level

Subsystem level










Optimal infrastructure choices


Optimal deployment

Choice of components


Single component design



Your system is just a component in another person's system



[AnnuRev'22]



Complex systems typically feature multi-stakeholders interactions



Policy makers (Michelle Wu, Mayor Boston)

Academia **Tech Developers** (Sally Kornbluth, MIT president)

Industry (Laura Major, CTO Motional)

congestion equity accessibility ROI liability

incentives, taxes

fleet sizes

policies regulations



Challenges for automated co-design of complex systems

Complexity when designing complex systems

Large systems

- Many components, scales
- Heterogeneous natures
- Multiple objectives

A fleet of autonomous vehicles



behavior software coordination hardware invasivity planning localization actuation sensing interaction control learning computation mapping regulations perception energetics infrastructure communication

Strategic interactions

- Many agents
- Heterogeneous interactions
- Conflicts/collaborations





Desiderata for the automation of complex systems co-design

Formal, domain-independent

Computationally tractable

- Need to compute solutions efficiently

Compositional, hierarchical

- My system is a component of somebody else's system

Collaborative

- Pooling knowledge from experts across fields.

Intellectually tractable

- Not exclusively accessible to system architects

Continuous

- Design is not static: it should be reactive to changes in goals and contexts



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Monotone Co-Design

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Complexity when designing complex systems

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
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A new approach to multi-disciplinary engineering "co"-design


- A new approach to **collaborative**, **computational**, **compositional**, **continuous** design designed to work across fields and across scales.
- Leverages domain theory, applied category theory, and optimization
- Roadmap:
 - Defining "design problems" for components.
 - Modeling **co-design constraints** in a complex **system**.
 - **Efficient** solution to design queries.




"Co-design diagram"

Pareto front of optimal designs









A new approach to multi-disciplinary engineering "co"-design

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
"Co-design diagram"



Access the book at: https://bit.ly/3qQNrdR

Pareto front of optimal designs










An abstract view of design problems

- > Across fields, design or synthesis problems are defined with **three spaces**:
 - **implementation space**: the **options** we can choose from;
 - **functionality space**: what we need to **provide/achieve**;
 - requirements/costs space: the resources we need to have available;





Partially ordered sets model trade-offs, across fields

▶ Posets model standard costs in engineering $\langle \mathbb{R}_{>0}, \leq \rangle$, $\langle \mathbb{N}, \leq \rangle$ • ... but also enable **richer** cost structures, with **incomparable** elements




Posets of rules, which induce priorities over behaviors






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







Transparent vs black-box models

> The "Design Problems with Implementations" model is a "transparent" model:



DP model: **direct feasibility relation** between functionality and resources ("black box") as a monotone map:



Monotonicity:

- Lower functionality does not require more resources;
- More **resources** do not provide **less functionality**.



Co-design enables a rich class of model population techniques

"Catalogues": off-the-shelf designs.






| | Spark | Phantom 3 Std | Phantom 4 Adv | Phantom 4 Pro | Mavic | Inspire |
|----------------|---|------------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| Flight time | 16 mins | 25 mins | 30 mins | 30 mins | 27 mins | 27 mins |
| Top Speed | 31 mph (50 km/h) | 36 mph (58 km/h) | 45 mph (72 km/h) | 45 mph (72 km/h) | 40 mph (65 km/h) | 58 mph (94 km/h) |
| Range | 1.2 miles (2 km) | 0.6 miles (1 km) | 4.3 miles (7 km) | 4.3 miles (7 km) | 4.3 miles (7 km) | 4.3 miles (7 km) |
| Camera | 12-MP stills 1080p video | 12-MP stills 2704 x 1520p video | 20-MP stills 4K 60fps video | 20-MP stills 4K 60fps video | 12-MP stills 4K video | 20.8-MP stills 4K/5K video |
| Size | 5.6 x 5.6 x 2.1 in (14.3 x 14.3 x 5.5 cm) | 13.8 in diagonal (350 mm) | 13.8 in diagonal (350 mm) | 13.8 in diagonal (350 mm) | 13.2 in diagonal (350 mm) | 16.8 x 12.5 x 16.7 in (42.7 x 31.7 x 42.5 cm) |
| Takeoff weight | 11.6 oz (330 g) | 2.6 lb (1.2 kg) | 3 lb (1.4 kg) | 3 lb (1.4 kg) | 1.6 lb (743 kg) | 8.8 lb (4 kg) |
| Other features | Follow me, Return home, Obstacle avoidance, FPV | Follow me, Return home | Follow me, Return home, Obstacle avoidance | Follow me, Return home, 3 Direction Obstacle avoidance | Follow me, Return home, Obstacle avoid- ance, folding arms | Obstacle avoidance, Spotlight Pro/Broadcast/ Composition mode |
| Price | US\$499 | US\$499 | US\$1,349 | US\$1,499 | US\$999 | US\$2,999 (\$6,198 with camera/gimbal) |

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"Catalogues": off-the-shelf designs.



• "First-principles": analytical relations.



Other features

Price


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|---|------------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
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mission energy \geq mission duration \times power consumption

Co-design enables a rich class of model population techniques

Price

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
Data-driven", "on-demand"


- The optimization will only ask for a **sequence** of data points. The model is constructed **incrementally**. -
- Opens the door to **experiments**, black-box **simulations**, solutions of **optimization problems**.

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mission energy \geq mission duration \times power consumption

Design problems can be composed in various ways, preserving properties





- The composition of any two DPs returns a DP (closure)
- Very practical tool to decompose large problems into subproblems


There is a category **DP** which is traced monoidal, and locally posetal



Multiple queries from the same design problem

• Two basic design queries are:

Given the functionality to be provided, what are the **minimal resources** required?




FixReqMaxFun

Given the resources that are available, what is the **maximal functionality** that can be provided?

Multiple queries from the same design problem

• Two basic design queries are:



Fix


Given the resources that are available, what is the **maximal functionality** that can be provided?

• The two problems are **dual**

FixReqMaxFun


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
Two basic design queries are:



Given the resources that are available, what is the **maximal functionality** that can be provided?

- We are looking for:
 - A map from functionality to **upper sets** of feasible resources:
 - A map from functionality to **antichains** of minimal resources: $h: \mathbf{F} \to \mathcal{A}\mathbf{R}$ -







Optimization semantics

> This is the semantics of **FixFunMinReq** as a **family of optimization problems**.


chosen •**(** ≤) by user rk J_k \mathbf{d}_k

 $f_k \in \langle \mathbf{F}_k, \leq_{\mathbf{F}_k} \rangle \qquad \mathbf{r}_k \in \langle \mathbf{R}_k, \leq_{\mathbf{R}_k} \rangle$ variables

constraints

for **each node**:

for each edge:



 $\mathbf{d}_k: \mathbf{F}_k \to \mathbf{R}_k$


component feasibility

Min **r**

 \leq

co-design constraint

objective




continuous spaces



Compositional solution of design problem queries

Suppose that we are given the map $h_k : \mathbf{F}_k \to \mathcal{A}\mathbf{R}_k$ for all nodes in the co-design graph



• Can we find the map $h: \mathbf{F} \to \mathcal{A}\mathbf{R}$ for the entire graph?


Compositional approach: just need to work out the composition formulas for all operations **solution**(**composition**(a, b)) = **composition**(**solution**(a), **solution**(b))

- We have a **complete solution**: guaranteed to find the set of **all** optimal solutions (if empty, **certificate of infeasibility**)
- > The complexity is **not combinatorial in the number of options** for each component
- > The complexity depends on the **complexity of the interactions**: the co-design **constraints**



... a functor between a category of problems and one of solutions

• The set of **minimal** feasible resources can be obtained as the **least fixed point** of a monotone function in the space of anti-chain









User-friendly interfaces

Catalogues": already available designs





• "First-principles": analytical relations.



```
provides capacity []
requires mass [g]
requires cost [USD]
500 kWh \leftarrow model1 \mapsto 100 g, 10 USD
600 \text{ kWh} \leftarrow \text{model2} \rightarrow 200 \text{ g, } 200 \text{ USD}
600 \text{ kWh} \longleftrightarrow \text{model3} \mapsto 250 \text{ g}, 150 \text{ USD}
700 \text{ kWh} \longleftrightarrow \text{model4} \mapsto 400 \text{ g}, 400 \text{ USD}
```

... and a solver

```
specific_energy_Li_Ion = 500 Wh / kg
```


```
required mass >= provided capacity / specific_energy_Li_Ion
```

```
required power ≽ c · provided lift<sup>2</sup>
```



Co-design across scales: from autonomy to mobility systems

Mobility systems are under pressure **Travel demand** is changing By 2050, 68% of population in cities



Need for **service design** and **regulations** *Over 1,000% ride-hailing increase in 2012-22*




• We look at the problem from the perspective of **municipalities** and **policy makers**

How many vehicles should we allow? How performant? Which infrastructure investments? Which services to encourage?

> Need for **demand-driven** co-design of **mobility solutions** and the **intermodal network** they enable

Several disciplines involved (transportation science, autonomy, economics, policy-making)

Need to meet **sustainability goals** *Cities cause 60% of GHGs, 30% from mobility*










Co-design to enable user-friendly tools to assess the impact of future mobility solutions







Motivation

- New challenges of engineering design
- *Motivation from autonomy and mobility*
- Desiderata for co-design
- Monotone Co-Design
 - *Modeling design problems*
 - Examples across domains
 - Design queries and optimization
 - From autonomy to mobility systems

Strategic interactions

- *Game theory to deal with strategic interactions*
- Hierarchical interactions in mobility systems
- Outlook on future research

Website containing all papers and more pointers: https://gioele.science

Agenda

Complexity when designing complex systems

Large systems

- Many components
- Heterogeneous natures
- Multiple objectives


Strategic interactions

- Many agents
- Heterogeneous interactions
- Conflicts/collaborations






Explicitly accounting for strategic interactions: towards co-design games





Explicitly accounting for strategic interactions: towards co-design games



Different design problems belong to different stakeholders

- Game theory: Multi-agent **strategic** decision making Allows one to **model interactions**
- > The notion of **optimal designs** extends to **equilibria of designs**
- ► Towards a theory of **co-design games**

Two **milestones** towards **co-design games**:

Co-design features **rich cost structures** (posets):


"**Posetal Games**" (games with posetal preferences) [RA-L' 22]

- **Interactions** are naturally **hierarchical**:
 - Mobility games via Stackelberg

[ITSC'21 (*Best Paper Award*), ITSC'23]



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
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



Interactions between stakeholders are characterized by different time horizons



Daily








Monthly








Hierarchical nature of interactions can be modeled via Stackelberg games

- We model **sequential** interactions as a **game**:
 - Municipality plays first
 - (choosing public transport **prices**, **taxes**)
 - The **mobility providers** interact **simultaneously** after the municipality (choosing **prices**, **fleet sizes**)
 - Customers **react** accordingly (choosing their **trip**)

- ▶ For instance:
 - Municipalities want to minimize emissions, and **maximize** social welfare, performance
 - **Mobility providers** want to **maximize** return on investment -
- The payoff depends on a **low-level model** of the mobility system (e.g., a **simulator**, an **optimization problem**)
- > We can compute equilibria via **backward induction**





[ITSC'21 (**Best Paper Award**), ITSC'23]



Considering strategic interactions for the city of Berlin, Germany

• We consider the city of **Berlin**, including:

Municipality



Actions:

- Short-distance PT price
- Long-distance PT price
- Cutoff distance
- Distance-based tax for AVs
- *Distance-based tax for empty AVs*

AMoD operator



Actions:

- Propulsion
- Automation level
- Fleet size

- Customers choose options by **minimizing** their **cost** (including **fare** and **value of time**)
- We consider 129,560 real travel requests and account for congestion effects

• We derive vehicle-related parameters and costs from catalogues and official reports

Micro-mobility operator



Actions:

- Base price
- *Mileage-dependent price*
- Vehicle type


Taxi company



Actions: - Base price

- *Mileage-dependent price*

Intermodal network in Berlin



Longitude








Looking for equilibria of the simultaneous game between MSPs

First, we compute **equilibria** of the **simultaneous** game between mobility providers:










Looking for equilibria of the sequential game

- We then compute the **equilibria** of the **sequential game**
- > The objective of the municipality is pure *political* matter. For each choice, we produce actionable information:






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Revenue-oriented City 2.5AMoD: 5,000 AVs, ICEV **Micromobility:** E-scooters, with fares: $\rm USD/h]$ - Base: 1.20 USD - Variable 0.96 USD/mile [100k]**Municipality:** Public transit fares: Revenue - SDP: 3 USD - LDP: 5 USD - Cutoff: 1.55 miles 0.5Taxes: - 1.28 USD/mile both on full and empty vehicles 1.351.31.25 1.2

1.15

1.1








Motivation

- New challenges of engineering design
- *Motivation from autonomy and mobility*
- Desiderata for co-design
- Monotone Co-Design
 - *Modeling design problems*
 - Examples across domains
 - Design queries and optimization
 - From autonomy to mobility systems
- Strategic interactions
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 - Partial order games

Outlook on future research

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Modeling & Algorithmic Foundations





Societal Applications User-friendly Tools



My lab will be building the next generation tools for systems design optimization



Modeling and Algorithmic Foundations

Leveraging optimization, control theory, game theory, domain theory, and applied category theory:

> Extend and improve current **modeling** & **solution algorithms** for **multi-objective** design optimization > Promote **interdisciplinarity** by bridging the gap between **standard optimization** and **co-design** > Explicitly account for strategic interactions of stakeholders, developing a theory of co-design games





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Societal Applications



Mobility, networks, infrastructure Strategic interactions at all levels

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Mission-driven autonomy







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Modeling and Algorithmic Foundations



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User-friendly Tools



Collaborative, intellectually tractable

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Mission-driven autonomy



Aerospace, automotive, production chains, energy and data networks



Authorities & Industry



Literature, workshops, classes













- A new approach to **co-design** designed to work **across fields** and **scales**.
- It is:
 - **Compositional** horizontally and hierarchically. -
 - Supports both **data-driven** and **model-based** components. -
 - **Computationally tractable**.
 - Intellectually tractable.
- Future: extend **modeling** and **algorithmic** capabilities
- We need to account for **strategic interactions** of **designers**:
 - **Posetal games**: A new class of games, where **utilities** are **posets**
- Future: uncertainty and computational schemes






Take-aways



Access the book at: https://bit.ly/3qQNrdR







Related references

- A. Censi, "A Mathematical Theory of Co-Design", *arXiv preprint arXiv:1512.08055*, 2015.
- A. Censi, J. Lorand, G. Zardini, "Applied Compositional Thinking for Engineers", work-in-progress book, 2023.
- G. Zardini, D. Milojevic, A. Censi, E. Frazzoli, "Co-Design of Embodied Intelligence: A Structured Approach", *IEEE/RSJ* International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2021.
- G. Zardini, A. Censi, E. Frazzoli, "Co-Design of Autonomous Systems: From Hardware Selection to Control Synthesis", EUCA European Control Conference (ECC), 2021.
- G. Zardini, Z. Suter, A. Censi, E. Frazzoli, "Task-driven Modular Co-Design of Vehicle Control Systems", *IEEE* Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2022.
- G. Zardini, N. Lanzetti, A. Censi, E. Frazzoli, M. Pavone, "Co-Design to Enable User-Friendly Tools to Assess the Impact of Future Mobility Solutions", IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, 2023.
- G. Zardini, N. Lanzetti, M. Pavone, E. Frazzoli, "Analysis and Control of Autonomous Mobility-on-Demand Systems", Annual Review of Control, Robotics, and Autonomous Systems, 2022.

- A. Zanardi*, G. Zardini*, S. Srinivasan, S. Bolognani, A. Censi, F. Dörfler, E. Frazzoli, "Posetal Games: Efficiency, existence, and refinement of equilibria in games with prioritized metrics", IEEE Robotics and Automation Letters, 2022.
- G. Zardini, N. Lanzetti, L. Guerrini, S. Bolognani, E. Frazzoli, F. Dörfler, "Game Theory to Study Interactions Between Mobility Stakeholders", IEEE International Intelligent Transportation Systems Conference (ITSC), Best Paper Award, 2021.

Co-Design of autonomy, mobility

Strategic Interactions

Co-Design basics









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- Future: uncertainty and computational schemes
- **Collaborators** for the presented works

Zelio Suter Laura Guerrini Dejan Milojevic Nicolas Lanzetti Alessandro Zanardi

Dr. Jonathan Lorand Dr. Saverio Bolognani Dr. Andrea Censi Prof. Florian Dörfler Prof. Marco Pavone Prof. Emilio Frazzoli

Stanford ETHzürich University

Take-aways

Questions?




I'm hiring!







Explicitly accounting for strategic interactions: towards co-design games



Different design problems belong to different stakeholders

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Co-design features **rich cost structures** (posets):


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Next time!

[ITSC'21 (*Best Paper Award*), ITSC'23]





Technology is evolving fast

- Autonomous systems (are?) will be ubiquitous in our lives
- > As engineers, we are getting **closer to the natural sciences**:



- In this talk Two important **challenges** for decision making.
 - Existing rules are written **by** humans **for** humans, and require **context** to be **interpreted**
 - Designed systems need to be **robust** to **complex**, **unconstrained environments**, featuring **interactions**

We create things that we do not fully understand, and then we study our creations





Behavior requirements for robots are numerous, vague, and conflicting



"Does your car have any idea why my car pulled it over?"

Function

Culture Example: Boston left Liability

Compliance to traffic rules

Extensive & diverse written by humans for humans

Courtesy

Comfort



Safety for human-driven vehicles

Safety (i.e., prevention of *unreasonable risks of driving*) is typically ensured by a mix of:

- **Certification** of vehicles and drivers
- **Rules** of the road
- **Enforcement** by authorities and legal system
- > Typically, **rules** rely on fundamental **axioms**, which require **interpretation**

Fundamental norm in Switzerland:

All road users must behave in such a way not to pose an obstacle or a danger to other road users

- No clear specification of safety
- It is legal to break the law to ensure safety





Things that do <u>not</u> work well for AV behavior specification

Hard constraints

- What do you do with **infeasibility**?
- Whenever you consider other actors, hard to find guarantees

▶ Case analysis, finite state machines, ...

- "IF statements kill people"

Just relax!

$$J = \alpha J_1 + \beta J_2 + \gamma J_3 + \dots$$

- Hard to re-tune, prone to **overfitting** -
- Lack of **transparency**





What should we do instead?




- > Throw the ball at **other stakeholders** Incorporate our own beliefs in our algorithms
- Create transparent systems
- Create customizable systems
- **Explain** issues to the public
- Engage with stakeholders of the problem (e.g., regulators, liability companies, etc.)



Minimum violation planning

- Assume that constraints will be violated, and find the alternative that *least* violates them
- > Define **rules** as a **total order** over realizations
- Order rules according to priority
- This is practical:
 - Allows modular definition of behavior
 - Easy to predict what the car will do
 - **Easy to understand** why the car did something
 - One can introduce **tolerances**

What if rules are incomparable, or indifferent?



See seminal work by Tumova, Karaman, Frazzoli



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We capture the richness of robot behavior requirements via partial orders

• We can use **pre-orders over rules** to express preferences

"Rule A is more important than rule B"

"Rule A and B are not comparable"

 \boldsymbol{A} B

Pre-order over rules induces pre-order over outcomes

b and *c* are **indifferent**

b, *c*, *d* are **preferred** over *a*


b, *c* are **incomparable** with *d*

 \boldsymbol{A}

"Rule A and B are indifferent"



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Minimum violation planning using partial orders, unbridled creativity and good taste

"The way to get good ideas is to get lots of ideas, and throw the bad ones away." — Linus Pauling

creativity



good taste




See Rulebooks work by Censi, Frazzoli, and others







Minimum violation planning using partial orders, unbridled creativity and good taste






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Defining and ordering rule groups for realistic scenarios


• Estimate: urban driving requires ~200 rules, ~20 rule groups





Defining and ordering rule groups for realistic scenarios

▶ Estimate: urban driving requires ~200 rules, ~20 rule groups



All of this is considering ego agents... How do these specifications work with multiple, interacting agents?



Posetal Games to deal with highly interactive multi-objective nature of decisions


- **Games** in short:
 - Each **player** has a **scalar utility function**
 - Based on **preferences**, players select an **action** from decision space
 - Given joint action profile of players, we obtain a game outcome for each player via a deterministic metric function
 - Equilibria are joint action profiles from which no player has interest to deviate






Posetal Games to deal with highly interactive multi-objective nature of decisions

- **Posetal games** in short:
 - Each **player** has a scalar utility function *partially ordered* preference over a set of metrics (scores, costs) -
 - Based on **preferences**, players select an **action** from decision space
 - Given joint **action profile** of players, we obtain a **game outcome** for each player via a *deterministic* **metric function Equilibria** are joint action profiles from which **no player** has **interest to deviate**



Technical results instantiated in trajectory driving games for urban scenarios






Posetal Games to deal with highly interactive multi-objective nature of decisions

> Posetal games extend standard notions in game theory, and

- Provide **sufficient** conditions for the existence of **Nash equilibria** (via **potential games**)
- Characterize efficiency of admissible equilibria -
- Design a **formal, systematic** way to leverage **preference refinement** (e.g., via *estimation*) to **refine equilibria**





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